Using a novel data set that links individual investment bankers to the acquisition deals they advise on, we find that individual investment bankers with greater deal experience are associated with higher acquisition returns and post-acquisition operating performance, particularly for acquirers in complex and more opaque industries. The advisory fee on acquisitions is also positively associated with the investment banking team's experience. Finally, when more experienced investment bankers switch to a new bank, acquirers are more likely to move with them. Overall, our results suggest that the human capital of individual investment bankers is valuable to acquirers.
I. Introduction
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value gains by client firms (see, e.g., Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Liu and Ritter (2011) , and Chemmanur and Krishnan (2012) ). A related literature theoretically and empirically analyzes how acquisition markets work and the source of value in acquisitions (see, e.g., Spiegel and Tookes (2013) , Alexandridis, Mavis, and Travlos (2012) ). A natural question that arises in this context regards the precise source of value creation by investment banks in securities issues and acquisitions: Are the information and knowledge needed to create value with the investment banker (worker) or with the investment bank (i.e., organization) where the individual is employed? 1, 2 We address several interesting questions in this article. First, do individual investment bankers contribute to value gains in acquisitions independent of the investment banks employing them? Second, is the relation between investment banker deal experience and acquisition performance causal? Third, is the experience of the investment banker related to the advisory fees earned by the bank? Finally, how does a given investment banker switching from one investment bank to another affect the propensity of an acquirer to follow the switching investment banker to the new bank employing him or her? 3 To develop testable hypotheses, we consider a setting in which an acquirer seeks to identify a target that provides the highest value-added (synergy) benefits to acquiring firm shareholders. The acquirer hires an investment bank to help accomplish this task. The investment banker works for the investment bank and is the agent who actually provides the advisory services. We assume that the value added by the target that the acquirer is able to identify with the advice of the investment bank is increasing in the skill level of the investment banker as well as the institutional strengths and experience of the investment bank in advising in prior acquisitions. Further, we assume that the skill level of investment bankers in identifying potential targets is increasing in their prior experience. 4 In this setting, the abnormal stock returns to an acquisition announcement (announcement effect) will reflect the value added to the acquirer by the target firm. Given that the magnitude of this value addition cannot be directly inferred by equity market participants at the time of the announcement merely by observing 1 The role played by the culture of an investment bank in contributing to value creation for client firms has been widely debated recently by practitioners. See, for example, "Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs" (New York Times, Mar. 14, 2012) by a former Goldman Sachs investment banker.
2 This question parallels an extensive literature on the economics of organizations that theoretically and empirically deals with the information held by workers and firms and their importance (see, e.g., Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005) , (2008), (2010)). 3 There are several anecdotes suggesting that the relationship between acquirers and individual investment bankers is of considerable importance in the acquirers' choice of investment banks to advise them (see, e.g., "CSFB Will Share Reebok M&A Fees after Taussig Defects to Lehman," Bloomberg, Nov. 15, 2005) . 4 Media articles provide anecdotal evidence that acquirers hire investment bankers whom they perceive as having the skill and ability to add value. To quote Lee Shavel, the chief executive officer (CFO) of NASDAQ OMX Group Inc. and a former investment banker, "a banker recently [approached us with something] we hadn't spent a lot of time thinking about, and the banker had a great ability to synthesize a complex situation, coherently articulate a rationale for the transaction and an execution strategy . . . . We were impressed with this banker's ability to do that, and decided to hire him" (see "How to Pick a Banker," Wall Street Journal (Apr. 3, 2012) ). The article goes on to indicate that successful deals may also benefit the investment bank: "they have some incentive to see deals be successful, since it may lead to more deals." the identity of target firms, the equity market will make use of the skill of the investment banker and the institutional strengths and experience of the investment bank advising on the deal to estimate this value. This, in turn, implies that the announcement effect of an acquisition will be increasing in the level of experience of the investment banker. Further, because the value added by the target to the acquirer is the present value of the incremental cash flows accruing to the combined firm in the long run due to the acquisition, the long-run operating performance of the combined firm will also be increasing in the experience of the investment banker advising on the acquisition. These effects are likely to be stronger for acquirers in industries where synergies with potential target firms are harder to evaluate.
Additionally, in this framework, the advisory fee earned by the investment bank will be increasing in the experience of the investment banker. Finally, consider the case of an acquirer undertaking two acquisitions where the investment banker advising on the first acquisition switches from the investment bank employing him or her (and that advised on the first acquisition) to another investment bank. We expect that the greater the experience of the original investment banker advising the acquirer, the more likely the acquirer is to switch with that investment banker when choosing an investment bank to advise the acquirer on his or her next acquisition. We discuss the underlying framework in more detail and develop testable hypotheses in Section II.
Data availability is an important constraint for any study analyzing the role of individual investment bankers. In particular, data linking bankers to specific acquisition deals is difficult to obtain. We overcome this difficulty by using a novel data set from Mergermarket Ltd. (formerly a subsidiary of Financial Times) that provides data on all the investment bankers working on the acquisition deals in our sample. We use this data set to obtain data on individual investment bankers and the deals that they advise. We use this data to calculate the investment bankers' prior deal experience. The prior deal experience of the investment banker (measured by total deal count as well as deal amount) is our main measure of investment banker human capital. Thus, we are able to obtain human capital measures for individual investment bankers for the first time in the literature. We also develop a measure of the human capital of the investment banking team working on a particular acquisition. We measure this as the average of the prior deal experience of all the investment bankers working on that acquisition.
We use the short-run cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm around the deal-announcement period (the announcement effect) as our first measure of acquisition performance. Our second measure of acquisition performance is the 3-year post-acquisition operating performance measured by abnormal return on assets (ROA) (Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) ). In our empirical analysis, we analyze the relationship between our acquisition performance measures and the human capital measures of investment bankers working on these acquisitions (discussed previously) while controlling for acquirer, deal, target, and investment bank characteristics.
Endogeneity is a potential concern in our empirical analysis. For instance, the potential selection of high-quality investment bankers by high-quality investment banks may affect our results. Further, high-quality acquirers may select higher-quality bankers to advise them, which may also affect our results. We use instrumental variables analyses to address these endogeneity concerns. We use the interaction between the market condition at the time that an investment banker obtains an undergraduate degree and the stage of the banker's career at the time of the deal as an instrument for their career prospects and thus experience. Recent studies (e.g., Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012) , Schoar and Zuo (2017) , and Oyer (2008) ) indicate that individuals who graduate in a poor economy have worse career outcomes, and such negative effects are most pronounced during the early part of their career. Given that market conditions at the time of the banker's graduation as well as the deal timing relative to the graduation date of the banker are plausibly exogenous, this provides us with a reasonable identification strategy.
We test how our measures of investment banker human capital are related to acquisition performance. We find a significant and positive relation between investment banker prior deal experience and acquisition CARs. Economically, a 1-interquartile-range increase in investment banker prior deal experience is associated with an increase of 109 basis points (bps) in the acquisition announcement CARs (roughly 14% of the interquartile range of CARs). We find a positive relation between investment banker prior deal experience and abnormal ROA in the ordinary least squares (OLS) setting. We also conduct our analysis using a measure of the investment banking team's level of experience and find that investment banking team experience is positively related to announcement CARs. Our instrumental variable (IV) analysis reveals that, even after controlling for the potential endogenous selection of investment bankers, the positive relation between investment banker deal experience and CARs continues to hold. Further, we find that abnormal ROA is positively related to investment banker deal experience in the IV setting. In the IV setting, aggregate investment banker team experience is also positively related to announcement CARs and abnormal ROA.
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The positive relation between acquirer CAR/operating performance and investment banker experience is stronger when the acquirer is in more complex and opaque industries, which we measure using the extent of industry-level research and development (R&D) expenditures and the extent of industry-level intangible assets. This result is consistent with the idea that investment banker skills in finding appropriate targets have a stronger impact in industries where acquirer synergy is harder to evaluate. We also find that investment banking team experience is positively associated with the advisory fee paid to the investment bank employing the investment banking team. Finally, we find that when investment bankers with greater prior deal experience switch employers, acquirers using the prior investment bank are more likely to switch to the new investment bank (employing their original investment banker) for acquisition advice. Moreover, this relation is significant only for acquirers in the industry that the investment banker specializes in.
Our article contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this is the first article to develop measures of the human capital of investment bankers and show that these measures are positively related to the measures of performance of acquisitions on which they served as advisors. Further, we show that this relationship is causal and not driven by the endogenous selection of investment bankers by investment banks or acquirers. Second, our results show that investment bankers add value to acquisitions over and above the contribution of the institutional strengths and experience of the investment banks employing them. Third, our results also show that the human capital of investment bankers directly affects the fees they receive for advisory services. Finally, our switching results show, for the first time in the literature, that experienced investment bankers are an important asset for investment banks that enables them to retain business and to acquire new business from their competitors in the market for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) advisory services.
This article is related to several strands in the existing literature. The literature closest to our work is the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of investment banks as intermediaries in the financial market: Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) , Welch (1992) , Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) , and Morrison and Wilhelm (2004) are examples of the relevant theoretical literature; Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Beatty and Welch (1996) , and Liu and Ritter (2011) are examples of the relevant empirical literature.
6 There is also a large literature on the role of investment banks and how they affect the performance of acquisitions (see, e.g., Bowers and Miller (1990) , Servaes and Zenner (1996) , Rau (2000) , Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) , Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) , Bao and Edmans (2011), and Golubov, Petmezas, and ). 7, 8 This article is also related to the broader literature on takeovers (see, e.g., Malatesta (1983) , Malatesta and Thompson (1993) , Harford (2005) , Boone and Mulherin (2008) , and Spiegel and Tookes (2013)). However, none of the previously mentioned works analyzes the role of individual investment bankers, which is our focus here.
Our article is also distantly related to the literature on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and turnover and the effect of CEO and management quality on firm performance. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) study whether different CEOs have different financial and investment policy styles and whether CEOs can affect firm performance. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) find that management-compensation fixed effects are related to corporate-policy 6 Morrison and Wilhelm (2004) develop a model of partnerships in human-capital-intensive industries (e.g., investment banking) where it is difficult to contract on the training effort of skilled agents, leading to a potentially socially suboptimal level of training. They show how partnership organizations can overcome this problem by tying human and financial capital.
7 It is also related to the broader literature on the role of investment banks in IPOs; see Ritter and Welch (2002) for a review. In a related article, Huang, Jiang, Lie, and Yang (2014) find that firms having investment bankers on their boards make better acquisitions. 8 Bradley, Choi, and Clarke (2011) find that an investment banker's industry expertise has an impact on the market share of the investment bank in that industry. In contrast to their article, which does not have any value implications, our article focuses on how investment banker human capital affects the performance of the acquisitions on which they advise. Moreover, whereas Bradley et al. (2011) conduct their analysis by allocating investment bankers to acquisitions based on their industry specialization, our data allow us to relate investment bankers to the specific deals that they were involved in. fixed effects. Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) find that higher-quality topmanagement teams of firms going public are associated with lower initial public offering (IPO) underpricing, more institutional investors, more reputable IPO underwriters, and better post-IPO operating performance. Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) find that higher management quality can also reduce information asymmetry and allows the firm to use a larger fraction of equity (and less debt) to raise external financing.
9 Further, our article is related to the literature on the role of human capital in the financial services industry. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) investigate how mutual fund manager quality is related to fund performance. They find that mutual fund managers who attend universities with high average test admission (SAT) scores manage better-performing funds. Herpfer (2016) finds that individual commercial bankers can have a significant impact on loan terms, and this effect is partly driven by their relationship-based informational advantage.
Finally, our article is also broadly related to the growing literature in organizational economics linking the importance of agents across and within organizations. For instance, Bandiera et al. (2010) find that workers are more productive when they work with higher-ability co-workers and less productive when they work with lower-ability co-workers. Bandiera et al. (2005) , (2008), (2013) study team and social effects in labor markets. Another related article in this literature is that by Lazear and Shaw (2007) , who argue that "successful investment bankers produce a higher dollar value-added (or productivity) per unit of effort . . . . In keeping with the higher productivity of investment banking, the firm must hire more highly talented people as investment bankers and pay them more."
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section II outlines the relevant theoretical framework and develops testable hypotheses. Section III describes our data and sample-selection procedure. Section IV provides a discussion of our empirical tests and results. Section V presents additional robustness tests and discusses possible alternative explanations. Section VI concludes.
II. Hypotheses Development and Testable Implications
We consider a setting in which an acquirer seeks to identify a target that provides the highest value-added (synergy) benefit to acquiring-firm shareholders. The acquirer hires an investment bank to help him or her accomplish this task. The investment banker works for the investment bank and is the agent who actually provides the advisory services. 10 We assume that the synergy value of the target 9 Our article is also broadly related to the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of managerial human capital in capital structure decisions; see Titman (1984) and Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010) for examples of the theoretical literature and Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2013) for an example on the empirical literature. It is also related to the theoretical literature relating managerial conservatism to project choice (see, e.g., Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) ). Our article is also related to the literature on the role of human capital in asset pricing (see, e.g., Fama and Schwert (1977) ).
10 Although, for ease of exposition, we refer to the investment bank as helping the acquirer to identify a suitable target, by this we mean the entire set of activities required to make a synergistic acquisition go through, starting with identifying a synergistic target (and ruling out inappropriate targets), preparing and making an appropriate bid for it, and convincing the target management to accept the acquirer's bid.
to the acquirer is increasing in the skill level of the investment banker as well as the institutional strengths and experience of the investment bank in advising in prior acquisitions. Further, we assume that the skill level of investment bankers in identifying potential targets is increasing in their prior experience. 11, 12 In this setting, the abnormal stock returns to an acquisition announcement (announcement effect) will reflect the value added to the acquirer by the target firm. Given that the magnitude of this value addition cannot be directly inferred by equity market participants at the time of the announcement merely by observing the identity of target firms, the equity market will make use of the skill of the investment banker and the institutional strengths and experience of the investment bank advising on the deal to infer this value. This, in turn, implies that the announcement effect of an acquisition will be increasing in the level of experience of the investment banker. Hypothesis 1. Holding the skill level of the investment bank constant, the market reaction to the announcement of an acquisition will be increasing in the experience of the investment banker advising in the acquisition.
Because the value added by the target to the acquirer is the present value of the incremental cash flows accruing to the combined firm in the long run due to the acquisition, the long-run operating performance of the combined firm will also be increasing in the experience of the investment banker advising on the acquisition.
Hypothesis 2. Holding the skill level of the investment bank constant, the longrun operating (accounting) performance of the combined firm will be increasing in the experience of the investment banker advising in the acquisition.
We also expect the positive impact of investment banker experience on acquisition performance to be greater if the industry of the acquirer is more opaque and complex. Investment banker skill will be more important in such industries because estimating synergy levels between acquirers and potential targets is likely to be more difficult in these industries.
Hypothesis 3. Holding the skill level of the investment bank constant, the positive relation between investment banker experience and merger performance 11 Throughout this section, for ease of exposition, we will refer to a single investment banker as providing the advisory service to the acquirer on behalf of the investment bank. In practice, there may be a whole team of investment bankers providing this advisory service. The testable implications we develop here will also apply in this case, with the investment banker experience we refer to being replaced by the average experience of the entire investment banking team involved in advising on a particular acquisition.
12 One concern may be that the setting we describe here abstracts away from the complexities of who initiates the deal (the acquirer or the target). However, the role of the acquirer investment banker will still involve similar activities even if the deal is initiated by the target. In particular, these activities, including vetting the target firm and performing due diligence on it, valuing the transaction for the specific target firm, and providing other strategic advice related to such activities as post-merger integration, synergies, and so forth, will still be part of the investment bank's mandate regardless of whether the target approaches the acquirer or vice versa. Naturally, there may be somewhat different weights put on which activities are more important based on who initiated the merger talks. Even here, however, the estimation of synergies for the acquirer will likely be the most important part of the investment bank's advisory role. We also empirically verify this assertion in robustness checks where we control our analysis for which party initiates the deal.
(both market reaction and long-run operating performance) will be increasing in the complexity and opaqueness of the acquirer's industry.
Assuming that the investment bank understands the value of its investment bankers' experience to the acquirer, it will price the services provided by more skilled investment bankers at a higher level. Thus, the advisory fee earned by the investment bank will be increasing in the experience of the investment banker.
Hypothesis 4. Holding the skill level of the investment bank constant, the advisory fee of the investment bank will be increasing in the experience of the investment banker advising in the acquisition.
So far, we have been discussing the case of a single acquisition by an acquirer. Consider now the case of an acquirer doing two acquisitions, one after the other. Further, let the investment banker advising the acquirer on the first acquisition switch from the investment bank advising on the first acquisition to another investment bank after the first acquisition but before the second acquisition.
13 If the acquirer were to stay with the same investment bank for acquisition advice on the second deal, that investment bank would assign a new investment banker to work with him or her. However, assuming that talented investment bankers are in short supply, the new investment banker assigned to the acquirer (by the original investment bank) may be of a lower skill level than the investment banker who advised the acquirer on the first acquisition. This means that, depending on the difference in skill between the original investment bank and the new investment bank and the difference in skill between the original investment banker and the new investment banker, the forecasted gross synergy of the deal to the acquirer may be lower or higher if the acquirer were to switch to a new investment bank along with the switching banker. If the synergy forecasted by the acquirer is greater by switching, the acquirer will switch to the new investment bank along with the original investment banker.
Hypothesis 5. For a given difference in the skill levels between the new and the original investment bank, the greater the experience of the original investment banker advising an acquirer, the more likely the acquirer is to switch along with that investment banker to the new bank for the next acquisition.
III. Data and Sample Selection
A. Sample Selection
Data on Investment Bankers
Our primary data source is the M&A data obtained from Mergermarket (U.S.) Ltd. Mergermarket gathers detailed data on acquisition deals and their advisors using a deals research team. The most important reason to use this database is that, unlike the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) M&A database, Mergermarket reports the names of the individual investment bankers who advise on acquisition deals. We collect data on investment bankers and the deals they have advised on from the Mergermarket database. The database starts in 1999 and is updated regularly. The database includes transactions with a deal value greater than or equal to $5 million. It includes mergers, acquisitions in which part or all of the company is acquired, and stake acquisitions in which the stake acquired is greater than 30%.
14 We obtain the name of the investment banker, the name of the investment bank advising the acquirer, the name of the acquirer, the name of the target, and the acquisition announcement date. Note that although the Mergermarket database provides the individual investment bankers' names, they may have duplicate observations with similar names (e.g., Jim Mabry vs. James Mabry). In some cases, Mergermarket provides us with aliases, whereas in other cases, we have to carefully hand-clean bankers' names and consolidate duplicate observations. We do this by looking at the names of the bank that the banker has worked for, how unusual the name is (e.g., Bob Kafafian vs. Robert Kafafian), and obvious typographical mistakes (Brian Perrault vs. Bryan Perrault). We thus spend a substantial amount of time hand-cleaning the investment banker names obtained from the database. Although we clean the investment banker data on our own, the Mergermarket database fortunately does provide a unique identifier for each deal, called Deal ID which allows us to collect deal information with greater ease.
We collect the sample of investment bankers who have advised at least two acquirers between 2001 and 2012 (using the "Individual League Table Search" section of the Mergermarket portal). For this set of bankers, we do an "Individual Profile" search in Mergermarket to collect data on all the deals that each investment banker has done in the past. Here, we do not put any screens on the deal experience of the banker: We collect data on all deals, including non-U.S. deals and deals in which the investment banker was a target advisor. We also do not put a restriction on the year, apart from ending the period in 2012. However, deal data before 2001 are sparse. This criterion provides us the starting set of 1,419 investment bankers and 5,789 deals. We use these data to create our measures of investment banker past experience.
Measures of Investment Banker Human Capital
Using the data set described previously, we create our main measure of investment banker quality, which is PRIOR DEAL EXP. This variable is defined as the log of 1 plus the number of acquisitions on which the investment banker has advised over the past 5 years (we include advisory services provided by the investment banker to acquiring firms and to target firms in calculating prior experience). We use a rolling 5-year window because recent experience is an indicator that the banker is an active participant and that his or her skills are current. In addition, we conduct our analysis using the deal amount to calculate experience instead of the deal count. Further, we use alternate measures of investment banker experience by calculating experience over a 3-year period instead of a 5-year period (PRIOR 3 YEAR EXP).
We also use the Mergermarket database to a create a human capital measure for the team of investment banker advisors working on a deal. We are able to do this because Mergermarket provides information about the team of investment bankers that advised on a deal. We measure TEAM EXPERIENCE as the average of PRIOR DEAL EXP over all the members of the investment banking team. As before, we calculate this measure using both deal counts and deal amounts.
Obtaining Acquisition Deals and Transaction-Level Data from the SDC M&A Database
For the set of investment bankers for whom we have experience measures, we compile the set of U.S. acquisitions on which these bankers were financial advisors for acquirers in the Mergermarket database, yielding 2,626 deals for 1,419 investment bankers. Note that this set can include deals where the acquirer may be private or public and can be based outside the United States, whereas our focus is on public acquirers (in order to be able to calculate announcement returns for the acquirer). Thus, we further restrict the data as described herein. We obtain detailed deal-level data on acquisitions from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database. We first obtain deals from the SDC database based on the following filters: The transaction value is reported and is at least $10 million, the acquirer is a public firm, deals are between U.S. acquirers and U.S. targets, the deal is not a rumored deal, and there is at least one advisor to the acquirer on the deal. In addition, we impose the restriction that the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target prior to the transaction and owns more than 50% of the target subsequent to the transaction. We also remove leveraged buyouts and private equity deals, exchange offers, repurchases, spinoffs, recapitalizations, and self-tender offers. Finally, we keep only the deals for which Compustat and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data are available for the acquirer firm. We then match this data set to the Mergermarket deals data based on target name, acquirer name, and year of deal announcement.
We also hand-match the name of the investment bank advising the deal from the Mergermarket data to the SDC data. The SDC data specify the actual role of the investment bank. We only keep advisors that actually provide financial advice and exclude investment banks retained for other roles, such as providing fairness opinions. This leaves us with 716 deals. Excluding deals for which we do not have all required control variables results in 1,293 banker deals with 709 investment bankers.
Sample Representativeness a. SDC Deal Comparison
Given that Mergermarket is relatively new to academic research, we check whether the data from this source are representative. First, we compare our data to the broader SDC sample. 15 We start by obtaining the total number of deals with U.S. targets and acquirers and compare it to the SDC sample (with a deal value higher than $5 million, which is the Mergermarket screen). Our results are reported in Panel A of Table 1 . For the overall sample, we conclude that Mergermarket contains a subset of SDC deals. SDC includes 93,138 deals with a median transaction value of $34.5 million, whereas Mergermarket contains 23,094 deals with a median transaction value of $50 million. We then eliminate international and private equity transactions from both data sets, after which the two data sets look much more comparable. These statistics are reported in Panel B of Table 1 . In particular, SDC has 22,537 such deals with a median transaction value of $47.8 million, whereas Mergermarket consists of 20,012 deals with a median transaction value of $45 million. The means suggest that although there is some extent of greater coverage of larger deals in Mergermarket, which has an average transaction size of $402.61 million versus $361 million for SDC, the difference is not very large.
We also report the fraction of deals by size bins from the SDC and Mergermarket samples. The results of these comparisons are reported in Panel C of Table 1 . Alleviating potential concerns that smaller deals (but above the $10 million cutoff) are more likely to be excluded from Mergermarket, we find that the size distributions across both samples are relatively comparable. Indeed, the smallest size bins ($10-$20 million and $20-$50 million) are relatively similar across both samples.
Our analysis reveals that the data provided by Mergermarket is a fairly reasonable representation of the SDC universe for U.S. non-private equity acquisitions. This helps allay any concerns of sample selection that may bias our results.
b. Advisory Role Data
We also address questions of how advisory role data are collected by Mergermarket and whether our results are affected by sample selection issues related to how different bankers report individual advisors to Mergermarket.
We held direct discussions with the Head of Advisory Content for the Americas at Mergermarket to obtain information on how these data are collected. The data on advisors is collected from multiple sources. One source of the data on advisors is the investment banks that are willing to report the advising team to Mergermarket. Mergermarket also gathers data on advisors (including financial advisors) from legal teams and law firms that work on a deal. A third source of data is online research, which includes regulatory filings, which may reveal certain connections between individual advisors and deals. Mergermarket then reaches out to those advisors to confirm that they were indeed on these deals. Finally, Mergermarket flags advisors who work for a certain acquirer, and when that acquirer makes a future acquisition, Mergermarket reaches out and confirms whether or not that advisor worked on that deal.
Another fact that came out during the discussions was that boutique banks are more likely to volunteer information than larger banks. They want the visibility, whereas larger banks are more concerned with poaching of talent and protection of their assets. However, there is no difference in reporting by type of deals. The representative also pointed out that, more recently, larger deals are being done by boutique banks. We also directly test for some of these sample-selection concerns in the data. We obtain data on whether or not investment banks in our sample are boutique banks from Song, Wei, and Zhou (2013) . 16 In unreported analysis (available from the authors), we regress the number of team members on a deal on various bank and deal characteristics. Without including bank fixed effects, we find that boutique banks have more investment bankers working on the deal. This could be reflective of a bias in the data or the possibility that investment banks that are larger are working on more deals per banker. It is likely that there is a combination of these effects reflected here. Importantly, when we include bank fixed effects, the boutique bank effect vanishes, illustrating the importance of controlling for investment bank fixed effects in our analysis. We do this in all our subsequent regressions.
c. Our Sample versus SDC Sample with Data Filters
We also compare SDC data and our sample of firms where we keep only firms from both data sets that clear all our sample-selection filters. In comparison to the SDC data, we only keep observations from the Mergermarket data that we use in our analysis (i.e., having individual investment banker data). The statistics for both data sets are reported in Panel D of Table 1 .
The median transaction size in our sample is $309.2 million, which is higher than that for the SDC sample ($202.8 million) . This difference may arise due to the need for screening deals where investment banker advisory data are available in Mergermarket. Consistent with this, the Mergermarket sample has a greater proportion of public targets being acquired (52% vs. 44%), lower percentage of cash (62% at the median relative to 73% for SDC), and higher acquirer size. Given these differences, we control for these variables in our analysis.
Instruments for Investment Banker Human Capital
Endogeneity is a potential concern in our empirical analysis. For instance, the potential selection of high-quality investment bankers by high-quality banks may affect our results. If higher-quality investment banks are able to consistently entice higher-quality investment bankers to work for them, for instance, by providing a more attractive compensation package, then our proxies for investment banker experience may reflect investment bank quality. Thus, one may be concerned that our results are really reflective of the underlying quality of the investment bank rather than the effect of the investment banker human capital. Further, high-quality acquirers may select higher-quality bankers to advise them, which could also affect our results. More precisely, if higher-quality acquirers prefer to work with bankers with whom they have had greater prior interaction (who may also be more experienced bankers), then one may be concerned that the positive relation between investment banker experience and acquisition performance really reflects acquiring-firm quality.
We use IV analyses to address the aforementioned endogeneity concerns. We use the market conditions at the time that an investment banker graduates from an undergraduate degree program and the timing of the acquisition deal relative to the banker's graduation date to create an instrument for banker experience. Recent studies (e.g., Oreopoulos et al. (2012) , Zuo (2017), and Oyer (2008) ) indicate that individuals who graduate in a poor economy will have worse career outcomes, at least initially. In particular, Oyer (2008) finds that stock market conditions at the time of graduation can have a significant negative impact on obtaining investment banking positions and long-term salary. Further, Oreopoulos et al. (2012) show that poor market conditions can significantly negatively impact career outcomes in the early part of one's career, although this gap is eventually corrected. Thus, worse market returns at the time of the graduation of investment bankers have been shown to have a negative effect on their human capital, particularly earlier in the investment banker's career.
In our context, investment bankers who graduate in worse market conditions may get their first investment banking job after a longer search period because investment banks are reluctant to hire in difficult market conditions. A later start to one's career will likely result in a longer time to accumulate deal experience, particularly during the early part of the career. Moreover, individuals joining investment banks in bad market conditions will start their employment in positions where there are likely to be fewer opportunities to gain deal experience. Compared with them, luckier cohorts (who graduate in strong market conditions) will gain investment banking jobs faster and start working on deals almost immediately.
However, this effect of the graduating market condition will diminish over time as one continues to gain experience. This argument is consistent with the evidence in Oreopoulos et al. (2012) indicating that the career effects of graduating market conditions eventually disappear. Given that the market conditions at the time of the banker's graduation and the timing of the deal (relative to the banker's graduation date) at the time of the acquisition deal are plausibly exogenous, this provides us with a reasonable identification strategy.
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To create our instrument, we hand-collect data on the educational background of the investment bankers, including their graduation years, from various Internet resources. For the IV analysis, we create the following variables: POOR GRAD YEAR STK MKT, which is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 stock returns in the 2 years prior to the investment banker's graduation from college is in the lowest quintile across all investment bankers in the sample, and 0 otherwise, and EARLY CAREER, which is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the time between the acquisition announcement year and the investment banker's college graduation year is less than the sample median (which is 15 years), and 0 otherwise. Thus, our instrument is the interaction term between POOR GRAD YEAR STK MKT and EARLY CAREER. We expect this interaction term to be negatively related to the investment banker's experience based on the arguments made previously.
By using an instrument related to the cohort of bankers graduating at a particular point in time, the identifying assumption we are making is that the allocation of investment bankers belonging to a particular cohort across acquirers is random (i.e., unrelated to the intrinsic quality of the acquisition). This assumption is likely to be satisfied because there is no reason why higher-quality firms should include a larger number of investment bankers belonging to a particular cohort in their advisory teams. Given this, and the fact that we include controls for POOR GRAD YEAR STK MKT and EARLY CAREER in our regressions, we believe that the exclusion restriction for our instrument is satisfied.
In addition, we control our IV models for GRADUATE DEGREE, which is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the investment banker has a graduate degree, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, to instrument our measures of investment banking team experience, we use a dummy variable, I(POOR MKT GRADUATES EARLY CAREER), which is equal to 1 if the deal has any banker who has EARLY CAREER equal to 1 and POOR GRAD YEAR STK MKT equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. In these models, we control for EARLY CAREER FRACTION, which is the fraction of investment bankers on the advisory team for the deal who have EARLY CAREER equal to 1; POOR GRAD YEAR STK MKT FRACTION, which is the fraction of investment bankers on the advisory team for the deal who have POOR GRAD YEAR STK MKT equal to 1; and GRADUATE DEGREE FRACTION, which is the fraction of the investment bankers on the advisory team for the deal who have a graduate degree.
Measures of Acquisition Outcomes
We use two measures of acquisition outcome. First, we use the short-run announcement period CARs of the acquirer. This is the announcement-period abnormal stock return of the acquirer calculated as the cumulative returns of the acquirer over a period of (−3, +3) days around the acquisition announcement (i.e., from 3 days prior to 3 days after the announcement of the deal) minus the predicted returns from a market model. We also use return windows of (−2, +2) days and (−5, +5) days to ensure our results are robust to the measurement window. Data on stock returns are obtained from CRSP.
Our second measure of acquisition performance is based on the long-run operating performance of the acquirer. Our measure of operating performance is ABNORMAL ROA and is similar to the one used by Chen et al. (2007) . This is calculated as the residual from the regression of the average 3-year postacquisition industry-adjusted ROA (operating income to assets) on the average 3-year pre-acquisition industry-adjusted ROA. The 3-year post-acquisition average refers to the average over 1, 2, and 3 years after the acquisition effective year, which is the year in which the acquisition is completed. Similarly, the 3-year preacquisition average refers to the average over 1, 2, and 3 years before the acquisition effective year. The industry-adjusted ROA for a given fiscal year is the firm's ROA in a year minus the median ROA of all the firms in the same Fama-French (1997) industry as the acquirer in that fiscal year.
Investment Bank Experience
We use ACQUIRER ADVISOR REPUTATION as our measure for the experience of the acquirer's investment bank. ACQUIRER ADVISOR REPUTATION, which is the reputation of an investment bank advising on a deal, is calculated as the total number of deals advised by the bank divided by the total number of all deals in the 5 years prior to the sample deal. If more than one bank advised the acquirer, we take the average market share of investment banks that advise the deal. Each investment bank advising the acquirer gets equal credit for a deal.
Other Variables
In our analyses, we control for deal and acquirer characteristics. We control for various deal-specific variables. Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) argue that the need for interaction and coordination between two firms will be greater when the target firm is larger relative to the acquirer. In those cases, it might be harder to integrate the target firm into the acquired firm. On the other hand, larger acquisitions might offer greater combination potential. Thus, we control our analysis for LOG TRANSACTION VALUE, which is the log of 1 plus the transaction value of the deal obtained from SDC Platinum.
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find higher acquirer returns for mergers financed with cash. We control our analyses for PERC CASH, which is the percentage of the payment for the transaction that is made with cash. We also control for whether or not the deal is friendly because targets acquired by hostile offers might be more difficult to integrate. Deals being friendly or not may have different implications for the role of investment banks. We control for FRIENDLY DEAL in our analysis, which is a dummy variable for whether or not the deal is friendly (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) ) based on SDC data, which define friendly deals as those that are recommended by the board. Moeller et al. (2004) find that acquirer shareholders gain more with tender offers. In the regressions, we include TENDER OFFER DEAL, which is a dummy variable for whether or not the deal is a tender offer. A greater share of the target owned by an acquirer pre-acquisition may make it easier to acquire the remaining interest. We control for PERC OWNED BEFORE in our analysis, which is the percentage of shares of the target company owned by the acquirer immediately prior to the deal.
18 Deals across different industries may be more complex and thus can affect acquisition value. We control our analysis for DIVERSIFYING DEAL, which is a dummy variable for whether or not the deal is a diversifying deal (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) ), where a deal is defined as diversifying if the primary Fama-French (1997) industry of the acquirer is different from that of the target. Fuller et al. (2002) report that acquirer returns are higher when the target is a private firm. This may be, in part, because public target firms may be more difficult to acquire and assimilate. Thus, we control for PUBLIC TARGET, which is a dummy variable for whether or not the target is a public firm. We obtain these deal-specific variables from the SDC Platinum database.
We also control for acquirer characteristics in our analysis. Moeller et al. (2004) document that there is a size effect in acquisition returns. Morck et al. (1990) find that better-performing firms make better acquisitions. Therefore, we control for LOG ACQUIRER ASSETS (Moeller et al. (2004) ), ACQUIRER MARKET TO BOOK (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) ), and ACQUIRER ROA (Morck et al. (1990) ). We calculate all accounting variables as of the fiscal year ending immediately before the deal-announcement date. We obtain all accounting data from the Compustat database. We also control for PRIOR 12 MONTH RET, which is the prior 12-month compounded stock returns of the acquirer (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) ). In our interaction tests, we use IND R&D TO ASSETS, which is the average of the ratio of R&D costs to assets for all Compustat firms by the Fama-French (1997) industry of the acquirer. We also use IND INTANGIBLES TO ASSETS, which is the average of the ratio of intangible assets to total assets for all Compustat firms by the Fama-French industry of the acquirer. All dependent and control variables are defined in the Appendix.
B. Summary Statistics
We report the summary statistics of several deal characteristics for our sample in Panel D of Table 1 . The median transaction value in our sample is $309.2 million. Of transactions in our sample, 7% are tender offers, and 99% are friendly deals. Of transactions in our sample, 32% are diversifying deals, and the median deal in our sample uses 62% cash to pay for the deal. Additionally, 52% of the target firms in our sample are publicly traded firms. The acquirers in our sample have a median asset value of $2.2 billion, median ROA of 10%, market-tobook ratio of 2.26, and prior-12-month stock returns of 13%. Finally, the median level of stockholding by the acquirer in the target firm is 0%. A significant proportion of acquirers in our sample do not hold a prior stake in the target firm. Finally, as we discussed earlier, there are certain differences between our sample and that from SDC with similar data filters (reported in Panel D), many of which are likely related to the transaction value (and reflected in other variables, e.g., PUBLIC TARGET).
In Panel A of Table 2 , we report the distribution of our banker experience variables. The median of deals that an average investment banker has worked on in the past 3 years is 2 (2.56 when calculated for the average banker over the prior 3 years). In terms of the dollar value of deals, the median investment banker has worked on about $600 million worth of deals in the prior 3 years ($7 billion when measured for the average banker over the prior 3 years). Our measures of investment banker experience for the 5-year period are similar or slightly higher, which makes intuitive sense. These statistics indicate that these reputation measures are skewed, and we use log transforms of these variables in our regression models.
In Panel B of Table 2 , we present the distribution of years of experience that the investment banker has in the investment banking industry. In the absence of a perfect experience measure, we use the age of the banker, measured as the number of years from the time of college graduation to the year of the deal announcement. Table 2 indicates that there is considerable heterogeneity in the experience of bankers in our sample and that our sample includes both junior and senior bankers. The median years since college graduation for the investment bankers in our sample is approximately 15 years.
IV. Empirical Results
A. Investment Banker Human Capital and Deal-Announcement CARs
Investment Banker Human Capital and CARs: OLS Analysis
In this section, we relate our measures of investment banker human capital to acquisition-announcement returns. In particular, we estimate the following model:
(1)
where y i jkt is the performance variable for the ith deal advised by the jth investment bank and the kth investment banker; x i jt denotes control variables that represent deal, acquirer, target, and time-varying bank characteristics; δ t denotes time fixed effects; α j denotes investment bank fixed effects; and w k is the time-varying measure of investment banker human capital (measured in log term to account for the skewness in its distribution). Table 3 presents the results of these OLS regressions. As before, we include a constant term, as well as bank, industry, and year of announcement fixed effects, in all regressions where CAR is the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the deal level. Columns 1 and 2 report regression results where the dependent variable is CAR for the window of (−2, +2) days around the announcement-day period. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 report results for the CAR window of (−3, +3) Table 3 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is dealannouncement returns. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_COUNT) is the log of 1 plus the number of deals that the banker has worked on over the past 5 years. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_AMOUNT) is the log of 1 plus the total deal value of the deals that the banker has worked on over the past 5 years. All other independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All specifications include a constant and industry, year, and bank fixed effects. We also report the number of bankers. Robust standard errors clustered at the acquisition level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. days, and columns 5 and 6 report our results for the CAR window of (−5, +5) days. We see that across all specifications, and for measures of investment banker experience based on both the number of deals and the dollar value of deals, the coefficient on banker experience is positive and statistically significant. From column 3, we calculate that a 1-interquartile-range increase in deal-number-based PRIOR DEAL EXP is associated with a 109-bps increase in acquirer CARs. Similarly, from column 4, a 1-interquartile-range increase in deal-amount-based PRIOR DEAL EXP is associated with a 94-bps increase in acquirer CAR.
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We also conduct various additional tests to ensure that our results are robust. We conduct our CAR regressions by controlling for industry-by-year fixed effects. We do this to rule out the possibility that merger waves may lead to biases in our regressions. In particular, suppose acquisitions in a particular industry perform extremely well in certain years (consistent with merger waves (e.g., Harford (2005) ); then our results may simply be artifacts of the performance of mergers in the banker's industry of specialization in certain years. Column 1 in Panels A and B of Table 4 reports the results of regressions with the dependent variable as CAR at the windows of (−3, +3) and (−5, +5), respectively. 20 These regressions have the same control variables as in Table 3 (unreported) and include industryby-year fixed effects. We find that our results are robust to controlling for timevarying unobservable industry characteristics, ruling out the effect of industryyear changes, such as merger waves, as driving our results.
We also want to rule out the potential for unobservable investment-bankrelated characteristics. For instance, we consider the possibility that certain investment banks are likely to get higher-quality deals, and such investment banks also hire the most experienced bankers. Our control for investment bank fixed effects in Table 3 does not rule out time-varying unobservable investment bank characteristics. We thus run our CAR regressions controlling for investment-bank-by-year fixed effects. Note, however, that these controls are likely to reduce the predictive ability of investment banker experience by eliminating the variation in this variable for bankers who do not switch investment banks. Even with this constraint, Table 4 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is dealannouncement returns. Panel A reports the results of the tests for CAR(−3, +3), and Panel B reports the results for CAR(−5,+5). PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_COUNT) is the log of 1 plus the number of deals that the banker has worked on over the past 5 years. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_AMOUNT) is the log of 1 plus the total deal value of the deals that the banker has worked on over the past 5 years. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of regressions of the prior deal experience of the banker on announcement returns with industry-year fixed effects and bank-year fixed effects, respectively. Columns 3-6 report the results of regressions in which the standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered by bank, bank-year, industry-year, and banker, respectively. All specifications include a constant, the control variables in Table 3 , and industry and year fixed effects. The specification reported in Column 1 has industry-year fixed effects. The specification reported in Column 2 has bank-year fixed effects. All other specifications include bank fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. we find, in column 2 of Panels A and B of Table 4 , that the coefficient on the investment banker experience variable is positive and statistically significant. Further, we subject our regressions to various different levels of clustering. Columns 3-6 of Table 4 report our CAR regressions after clustering at the level of bank, bank by year, industry by year, and investment banker, respectively. Our results are consistent with those reported previously, even with different types of clustering methodologies.
Investment Banker Human Capital and CAR: IV Analysis
As mentioned previously, we address endogeneity issues in an IV framework. We thus conduct 2-stage least squares (2SLS) where the first-stage dependent variable is PRIOR DEAL EXP (DEAL COUNT) and the second-stage dependent variable is CAR.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results of the 2SLS regressions. The firststage results are reported in column 1 and suggest that our instrument (POOR GRAD YEAR STK MKT × EARLY CAREER) is negatively related to PRIOR DEAL EXP, as expected. The first-stage F-statistic is 28.91 and highly significant (at the 1% level), indicating that our instrument is a strong predictor of PRIOR DEAL EXP.
Columns 2-4 of Panel A in Table 5 indicate that, consistent with the OLS analysis previously reported, PRIOR DEAL EXP is positively related to acquisition CAR over the (−2, +2), (−3, +3), and (−5, +5) windows, respectively. Thus, even after controlling for potential endogenous selection of investment bankers, we find that investment banker human capital is positively related to acquisition CAR. It is therefore unlikely that our prior results are driven by selection and endogeneity issues. Panel B reports similar results with the deal-amount-based measure of investment banker experience.
B. Investment Banker Human Capital and Post-Acquisition Operating
Performance: OLS Analysis
Investment Banker Human Capital and Operating Performance
We examine the relationship between our measures of investment banker human capital and post-acquisition operating performance in this section. Thus, we estimate our OLS model with ABNORMAL ROA as the dependent variable. Note that in all our regressions with ABNORMAL ROA, we control for effective-year fixed effects because ABNORMAL ROA is measured relative to the effective year. The results of this analysis are presented in Panel A of Table 6 . In column 1, we find a significant relation between PRIOR DEAL EXP (DEAL COUNT) and ABNORMAL ROA. Economically, this result indicates that a 1-interquartile-range increase in the PRIOR DEAL EXP (DEAL COUNT) variable is associated with a 0.8-percentage-point change in ABNORMALbetween investment banker human capital and the post-acquisition operating performance of the acquirer. Table 5 reports the results of instrumental variable (IV) regressions in which PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_COUNT) is the endogenous variable. Panel B reports IV regression results with PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_AMOUNT) as the endogenous variable. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_COUNT) is the log of 1 plus the number of deals that the banker has worked on over the past 5 years. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_AMOUNT) is the log of 1 plus the total deal value of the deals that the banker has worked on over the past 5 years. POOR_GRAD_YEAR_STK_MKT is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 stock returns in the 2 years prior to the investment banker's graduation from college are in the lowest quintile across all investment bankers in the sample, and 0 otherwise. EARLY_CAREER is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the time between the acquisition-announcement year and the investment banker's college graduation year is less than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. POOR_GRAD_YEAR_STK_MKT × EARLY_CAREER is the interaction of POOR_GRAD_YEAR_STK_MKT and EARLY_CAREER. GRADUATE_DEGREE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the investment banker has a graduate degree, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. All specifications include a constant and industry, year, and bank fixed effects. We also report the number of bankers. Robust standard errors clustered at the acquisition level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Investment Banker Human Capital and Operating Performance: IV Analysis
We also conduct our IV analysis with ABNORMAL ROA as the outcome variable. Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of this analysis with PRIOR DEAL EXP as the endogenous variable. We use the same instrument as before. The results from first-stage regressions show that our instrument (POOR GRAD YEAR STK MKT × EARLY CAREER) is a negative and significant predictor of PRIOR DEAL EXP (first-stage F-statistic is 14.44 and significant at the 1% level). The results in the second column of Panel B indicate that after we account for potential endogeneity between ABNORMAL ROA and PRIOR DEAL EXP, we find that PRIOR DEAL EXP (DEAL COUNT) is significantly and positively related to ABNORMAL ROA. These results are consistent with those for CAR (described previously) and indicate that investment banker human capital is indeed positively associated with acquisition performance.
Columns 3 and 4 of Panel B in Table 6 report the 2SLS regression results with PRIOR DEAL EXP (DEAL AMOUNT) as the endogenous variable. We see that our results are similar to those in the previous two columns. Broadly, the CAR and ABNORMAL ROA results reported previously are consistent with the implications of our theoretical framework. That is, investment banker experience is positively related to the acquisition announcement effect and long-run operating performance of the acquirer.
TABLE 6
Investment Banker Experience and Abnormal ROA Table 6 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in Panel A and instrumental variable (IV) regressions in Panel B, where the dependent variable is the post-acquisition operating performance of the acquirer as measured by abnormal return on assets (ROA). The calculation of abnormal ROA is explained in the Appendix. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_COUNT) is the log of 1 plus the number of deals that the banker has worked on over the past 5 years. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_AMOUNT) is the log of 1 plus the total deal value of the deals that the banker has worked on over the past 5 years. POOR_GRAD_YEAR_STK_MKT is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 stock returns in the 2 years prior to the investment banker's graduation from college are in the lowest quintile across all investment bankers in the sample, and 0 otherwise. EARLY_CAREER is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the time between the acquisition-announcement year and the investment banker's college graduation year is less than the sample median. POOR_GRAD_YEAR_STK_MKT × EARLY_CAREER is the interaction of POOR_GRAD_YEAR_STK_MKT and EARLY_CAREER. GRADUATE_DEGREE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the investment banker has a graduate degree, and 0 otherwise. All other independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All specifications include a constant and year and bank fixed effects. We also report the number of bankers. Robust standard errors clustered at the acquisition level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 21 Consistent with our expectations, we find that the positive relation between investment banker experience and acquisition performance (CAR and ABNORMAL ROA) is stronger when the acquirer is in complex and opaque industries, as measured by industry R&D expenditures and intangibles. Table 7 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable in Panel A is deal-announcement returns and that in Panel B is the abnormal return on assets (ROA). The calculation of abnormal ROA is explained in the Appendix. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_COUNT) is the log of 1 plus the number of deals that the banker has worked on over the past 5 years. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP (DEAL_AMOUNT) is the log of 1 plus the total deal value of the deals that the banker has worked on over the past 5 years. IND_R&D_TO_ASSETS is the average industry ratio of research and development (R&D) to assets in the industry of the acquirer. IND_INTANGIBLES_TO_ASSETS is the average industry ratio of intangibles to assets in the industry of the acquirer. All specifications include a constant, year and bank fixed effects, and control variables. Panel A models additionally include industry fixed effects. We also report the number of bankers. Robust standard errors clustered at the acquisition level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This is likely because estimating synergies between potential target firms and the acquirer is considerably harder in such industries. These results provide additional validation of the idea that investment bankers provide value by selecting appropriate targets for acquirers. 
D. Investment Banking Team Experience and Deal Performance
Because M&A advisory involves a team of bankers working on a deal, we explore how the quality of the team of individuals who work on a deal is associated with acquisition performance. In this section, we investigate the impact of team experience on deal-announcement returns and the post-acquisition operating performance of the acquirer. In particular, we are interested in how TEAM EXPERIENCE affects acquisition performance.
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of the OLS analysis for acquisitionannouncement CAR. 23 The coefficient estimates in Table 8 show that investment banking TEAM EXPERIENCE (DEAL COUNT) is significantly and positively related to acquirer CAR, measured across various windows of time. This result is consistent with the results in the prior section suggesting that individual banker experience is positively related to acquirer CAR. Economically, a 1-interquartile increase in TEAM EXPERIENCE (DEAL COUNT) is associated with a 1.6-percentage-point increase in CAR(−3, +3). We find similar results for TEAM EXPERIENCE (DEAL AMOUNT).
In addition, we conduct our team-level analysis in an IV framework. We use I(POOR MKT GRADUATES EARLY CAREER) as our instrument for team experience. We also control these regressions for EARLY CAREER FRACTION Table 8 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) regressions where the dependent variable is deal-announcement returns. TEAM_EXPERIENCE (DEAL_COUNT) is the average across all investment bankers of the log of 1 plus the number of deals each investment banker has worked on over the past 5 years. TEAM_ EXPERIENCE (DEAL_AMOUNT) is the average across all investment bankers of the log of 1 plus the total value of deals each investment banker has worked on over the past 5 years. TEAM_EXPERIENCE (DEAL_COUNT) and TEAM_ EXPERIENCE (DEAL_AMOUNT) are the endogenous variables in the IV regressions. EARLY CAREER is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the time between the acquisition announcement year and the investment banker's college graduation year is less than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. POOR_GRAD_YEAR_STK_MKT is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the Standard & Poor's (S&P) stock returns in the 2 years prior to the investment banker's graduation from college are in the lowest quintile across all investment bankers in the sample. I(POOR_MKT_GRADUATES_EARLY_CAREER) is a dummy variable for whether or not the deal has any bankers who have EARLY CAREER equal to 1 and POOR_ GRAD_YEAR_STK_MKT equal to 1. All specifications include a constant; industry, year, and bank fixed effects; and control variables. We also report the number of bankers. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. and POOR GRAD YEAR STK MKT FRACTION. Panels B and C of Table 8 report the IV analyses results. Turning to column 1 of Panel B, we find that the instrument is significant and negative predictor of TEAM EXPERIENCE (first-stage F-statistic is 12.58 and significant at the 1% level). Column 2 shows that the coefficient estimate for TEAM EXPERIENCE (DEAL COUNT) is positive and significant, indicating that acquisitions advised by highly experienced teams of investment bankers have higher announcement returns over the window of (−2, +2) days. Panel C confirms that these results are similar when we use CAR(−3, +3) and CAR(−5, +5). Our results are qualitatively similar when we use the TEAM EXPERIENCE (DEAL AMOUNT) variable. We conduct our team-level analysis for ABNORMAL ROA as the dependent variable as well. Table 9 reports the results of the analysis of the impact of investment banking team experience on the ABNORMAL ROA of the acquirer. In the OLS models, reported in columns 1 and 2, we do not find any significant relation between TEAM EXPERIENCE and ABNORMAL ROA. In columns 3 and 4, we report the second-stage regression results for the IV analysis. We find that after we account for the endogeneity of investment banking team experience, acquirers advised by experienced investment banking teams have higher ABNORMAL ROA for measures based on both deal count and deal amount. Overall, the results in this section are consistent with those from previous sections. That is, investment banker team quality has a significant and positive effect on acquisition performance. Table 9 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) regressions where the dependent variable is the post-acquisition operating performance of the acquirer as measured by abnormal return on assets (ROA). The calculation of abnormal ROA is explained in the Appendix. TEAM_EXPERIENCE (DEAL_COUNT) is the log of 1 plus the average number of deals the investment banker's team has worked on over the past 5 years. TEAM_EXPERIENCE (DEAL_AMOUNT) is the log of 1 plus the average total value of the deals the investment banker's team has worked on over the past 5 years. TEAM_EXPERIENCE (DEAL_COUNT) and TEAM_EXPERIENCE (DEAL_AMOUNT) are the endogenous variables in the IV regressions. EARLY_CAREER is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the time between the acquisitionannouncement year and the investment banker's college graduation year is less than the sample median, and 0 otherwise. EARLY_CAREER_FRACTION is the fraction of the investment banking team members who have EARLY_CAREER equal to 1. POOR_GRAD_YEAR_STK_MKT is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the Standard & Poor's (S&P) stock returns in the 2 years prior to the investment banker's graduation from college are in the lowest quintile across all investment bankers in the sample. POOR_GRAD_YEAR_STK_MKT_FRACTION is the fraction of the investment banking team members who have POOR_GRAD_YEAR_STK_MKT equal to 1. GRADUATE_DEGREE_FRACTION is the fraction of the investment banking team members who have a graduate degree. All other independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All specifications include a constant and year and bank fixed effects. We also report the number of bankers. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
E. Investment Banker Human Capital and Advisory Fees
We expect that investment banking teams with more human capital are more likely to elicit higher fees. We thus relate investment banker team experience to the advisory fee as a fraction of deal amount. Thus, our dependent variable is the log of 1 plus the advisory fee as a fraction of deal size. The result of this test is reported in Table 10 . The SDC database does not have fee data for all Table 10 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is the log of 1 plus the advisory fee fraction on an acquisition deal. TEAM_EXPERIENCE (DEAL_COUNT) is the log of 1 plus the average number of deals the investment banker's team has worked on over the past 5 years. TEAM_EXPERIENCE (DEAL_AMOUNT) is the log of 1 plus the average total value of the deals the investment banker's team has worked on over the past 5 years. All other independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All specifications include a constant and industry, year, and bank fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the acquisition level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. deals, and thus our sample size shrinks substantially for this test. 24 Despite the lower power, this test indicates that investment banking team experience (based on both deal count and deal amount) is positively related to deal fees. This is consistent with our conjecture that investment banker human capital has a positive and significant association with deal value (synergy). It also reflects the value of investment banker human capital to investment banks in terms of directly affecting an important source of revenue for the banks.
This result provides additional validation that investment bankers do drive value for acquirers and, in turn, for their own employers. Viewed in combination with the other results in the article, our results here suggest that investment banker human capital is an important determinant of acquisition value.
F. Investment Banker Human Capital and the Propensity of Acquirers to Switch Investment Banks
We also investigate how the investment banker's deal experience affects the acquirer's choice of the investment bank to advise on the deal. In particular, we analyze whether acquirers follow experienced investment bankers when they switch jobs to a new bank. The need to restrict the sample to acquirers that conduct at least one acquisition before and at least one acquisition after the investment banker's switch reduces the sample size considerably and reduces our statistical power if we only use deals actually advised by the investment banker (as defined in the Mergermarket data). Thus, we start with all acquirers that obtain advisory services from the investment banker's previous bank that acquire again after the banker switches to the new bank. We then classify those acquirers as being in the same industry as the investment banker's specialization or not.
25 Thus, BANKER INDUSTRY is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the acquirer's industry is one in which the investment banker works, and 0 otherwise. The investment banker's industries are defined as the Fama-French (1997) industries of all the acquirers they have advised in the sample period.
NOT BANKER INDUSTRY is a dummy variable that is defined as 1 minus BANKER INDUSTRY.
We then analyze whether the choice of multiple acquirers to use the investment banker's new bank as the advisor on the next deal depends on the switching investment banker's prior deal experience, based on deal count. Further, we test whether the effect of prior deal experience on the choice of the new bank varies depending on whether the acquirer's industry is one in which the investment banker works (i.e., BANKER INDUSTRY = 1) or not (i.e., NOT BANKER INDUSTRY = 1). Thus, firms in the same industry as the banker can be considered loosely as a "treatment" group, whereas those not in the banker's industry can be thought of as a control group. If acquirers indeed move with experienced investment bankers because they want to continue to work with them, then this effect should be more important for acquirers in industries that the investment bankers work in. In our analysis, we also control for DIFFERENCE IN BANK REPUTATION, which is defined as the ACQUIRER ADVISOR REPUTATION of the post-switch bank minus the ACQUIRER ADVISOR REPUTATION of the pre-switch bank. Further, we control for the year of the banker-switch fixed effects.
The results of this test are reported in Table 11 . Columns 1 and 2 report the result of Poisson models where the dependent variable is the number of times that the acquirer uses the switching investment banker's new bank as a financial advisor on subsequent acquisitions. Columns 3 and 4 report the result of fractional logit models where the dependent variable is the fraction of subsequent acquisitions on which the acquirer uses the banker's new bank as an advisor. Columns 5
TABLE 11
Propensity of the Acquirer to Follow the Investment Banker to the New Investment Bank Table 11 presents the results of the analyses of the effect of prior deal experience on whether the acquirer subsequently used the banker's new bank for acquisition advising and the number of times the acquirer used the acquirer's new bank in advising. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP is the log of 1 plus the number of deals that the banker has worked on over the past 5 years. NOT_BANKER_INDUSTRY is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer is not in the industry the banker specializes in, and 0 otherwise. BANKER_INDUSTRY is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer is in the industry the banker specializes in, and 0 otherwise. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP × BANKER_INDUSTRY is the interaction of PRIOR_DEAL_EXP and the BANKER_INDUSTRY dummy. PRIOR_DEAL_EXP × NOT_BANKER_INDUSTRY is defined similarly. DIFFERENCE_IN_BANK_REPUTATION is the difference in the ACQUIRER_ADVISOR_REPUTATION of the post-switch bank and the ACQUIRER_ADVISOR_REPUTATION of the pre-switch bank. All regressions include a constant, acquirer-industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects for the year the banker switches his or her employer bank. Columns 2, 4, and 6 also include acquirer-industry × year-of-banker-switch fixed effects. The last row shows the differences in the coefficient estimates of the two interaction variables. Robust standard errors, clustered at the banker level, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. and 6 report the results of logit models where the dependent variable is 1 if the acquirer uses the banker's new bank as an advisor in a subsequent acquisition, and 0 otherwise. Columns 1, 3, and 5 contain acquirer-industry fixed effects and year fixed effects for the year the banker switches its employer bank. To control for industry time trends, columns 2, 4, and 6 also contain acquirer-industry × yearof-banker-switch fixed effects. The latter tests rule out the impact of investment bankers changing jobs at certain times when a particular industry has significant merger activity.
Our results are consistent across all models. They indicate a positive relation between prior deal experience and the number of times (or fraction of times) the acquirer hires the banker's new bank as well as the propensity of the acquirer to use the new employer of the banker as an advisor on a subsequent acquisition, primarily when the acquirer is in the same industry as the banker. Specifically, the coefficient estimate on PRIOR DEAL EXP × BANKER INDUSTRY is positive in all specifications and statistically significant, whereas that on PRIOR DEAL EXP × NOT BANKER INDUSTRY is not significant in all but one specification. Moreover, the difference between the two coefficient estimates is statistically significant (reported in the last row).
Broadly, the results in this section (and those from prior sections) suggest that more experienced investment bankers can add value to acquirers, over and above the effect of bank reputation. Acquirers recognize this value and prefer to follow high-value investment bankers to their new banks. One concern with our results may be that they are affected by who initiates the deal (acquirer or target) and whether or not the deal is an auction or a negotiation (Boone and Mulherin (2008) ). These variables might affect the nature of the transaction and hence the role of investment banks. We start by collecting additional data for our sample deals. We define auctions and negotiation deals in a similar manner as Boone and Mulherin (2008) . For each observation, we use U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documents to characterize the depth of bidder competition prior to the public announcement of the takeover.
Using these data, we define auctions as takeovers in which the selling firm contacts multiple potential buyers and usually signs confidentiality agreements with more than one possible buyer. We define negotiations as takeovers in which the selling firm focuses on a single buyer. Note that we are able to find this information in SEC filings for 380 deals. Of these, 154 were auctions (representing 40.5% of deals), 224 were negotiations (representing 58.9% of deals), and 2 were unsolicited bids. These numbers compare well to Boone and Mulherin (2008) , who find that 47% of their sample is composed of auctions.
We also gather data on who initiates the deal from SEC filings. Among the 380 deals for which we are able to obtain data on who initiates the deals, we find that 43.4% of deals are initiated by acquirers and 43.7% of deals are initiated by targets, whereas 12.6% of deals are considered to be initiated by both or where the description of the deal in SEC filings was not clear as to who initiated the deal. Broadly, there is no evidence of significant tilt in our sample toward one type of initiator.
We also conduct our baseline CAR regressions controlling for the ACQUIRER INITIATES and NEGOTIATION deal dummy variables, which are equal to 1 if the deal is defined as acquirer initiated or a negotiation, respectively, based on the previous classification methods, and 0 otherwise. Our results, reported in column 1 of Panel A in Table 12 , are consistent with those reported earlier in the article. Thus, our results are not driven by the type of deal (negotiation) or who initiates the deal.
B. Target Advisors
In our analysis, we focus on acquirer advisors. This is for two reasons. First, target-firm shareholders receive value upfront in transactions, whereas acquirer shareholders' long-term value through synergies and future utilization of the bankers' advisory service will be affected by the current quality of advisory service. This provides a richer set of implications for our analysis. Second, a practical issue relating to why we focus on acquirers is that many targets are private firms, which reduces the power of our analysis due to the lack of data.
Nevertheless, we address the concern here that target-firm advisors can also impact acquirer value by analyzing the impact of target investment banker experience on the deal outcomes. In the first set of analyses, reported in column 2 of Panel A in Table 12 , we control our baseline CAR regressions for the average experience of the target investment banker team. In these regressions, we only include deals that are present in our original analysis and where we have data on the identity of the target advisors. In all these tests, our results are consistent with our primary analysis; namely, higher-reputation acquirer investment bankers are associated with higher deal value. We do not find evidence of a significant relation between target advisor team experience and acquirer outcomes. Furthermore, we create a data set with the experience of target advisors regardless of whether or not we have acquirer advisor banker data. Here, we analyze the effect of target advisor experience on deal outcomes instead of that of acquirer advisor experience. This is essentially the same analysis reported in Table 3 but with target investment bankers instead of acquirer investment bankers. In these tests we also include target bank fixed effects. In these tests, reported in column 3 of Panel A in Table 12 , we find some evidence of a negative relation between target investment banker reputation and acquirer CAR, consistent with the idea that the target investment banker's job is to extract the largest possible fraction of the value of the synergy on behalf of target-firm shareholders, likely at the expense of acquirers.
C. Conflicts of Interest
Conflicts of interest in acquisition advisory are a growing concern. We thus consider whether our results are affected by the presence of conflicts. One way to measure conflicts is to compare our results across boutiques and full-service banks. We find that 37% of the deals in our sample have at least one boutique investment bank advising them. Further, of all the bankers in our sample, 41% worked at boutique investment banks at some point in their careers. Although the presence of boutiques is, to a certain extent, controlled for by investment bank fixed effects, these effects might still impact the variables we are analyzing. Thus, we interact the measures of investment banker reputation with the boutique bank dummy in our baseline CAR analysis, and we find that our results are consistent with our primary analysis; namely, investment banker reputation is positively associated with deal outcomes. Moreover, there is no statistical significance on the interaction term between boutique investment banks and investment advisor experience. The results of these tests are reported in column 4 of Panel A in Table 12 .
We also control our analysis with a dummy variable for holding a stake or the percentage stake held by the acquirer investment bank in the acquirer and the target firm and for the interaction between these variables and our measure of investment banker experience. The results of this analysis are reported in columns 5-7 of Panel A. In all, we do not find any significant changes in our primary results after controlling for the investment banks' equity stakes in the acquirer and target firm. Thus, our primary results are unlikely to be driven by potential conflicts of interest.
D. Prior Ownership Stake
It is also possible that acquirers having a significant ownership stake in the target firm prior to the acquisition may have an advantage in negotiations. We thus consider whether our results change when we control for the interaction term between the percentage of shares owned and the measures of investment banker experience in our baseline analysis. Our analysis, reported in column 8 of Panel A in Table 12 , shows no statistically significant effect of the interaction term, and more importantly, it shows that our primary results continue to hold in these tests.
E. Serial Acquirers
Furthermore, we conduct our analysis controlling for a serial acquirer dummy as well as the serial acquirer dummy interacted with our investment banker experience measures. Following Fuller et al. (2002) , we define serial acquirers as bidders that have successfully acquired five or more firms within a 3-year period from 2001 to 2012. The results of this analysis are reported in column 9 of Panel A in Table 12 . Our results after controlling for serial acquirers are consistent with those reported earlier. Thus, it is unlikely that our results are affected by serial acquirers.
F. Measurement of Investment Banker Experience
We also want to ensure that our results are not driven by the particular manner in which we calculate investment banker experience. Thus, we re-create our measures of investment banker experience in three ways. First, there may be some concern that our measures of investment banker experience do not account for industry expertise and are coarse. 26 We create industry-specific measures of investment banker experience based on the acquirer's Fama-French (1997) industry as well as based on Mergermarket's sector definitions. Our baseline CAR results using these alternative measures obtain similar results as the broad measure. We report the OLS results using the Mergermarket sector-based analysis in column 1 of Panel B in Table 12 and using the Fama-French industries in column 2 of Panel B.
Another concern may be that our 3-and 5-year measurement windows for measuring investment banker experience can lead to potential mismeasurement of investment banker experience. We alleviate such a concern by conducting our baseline analyses with all available past advisory experience of the investment banker (as opposed to restricting it to the past 3 or 5 years). Our results, reported in column 3 of Panel B in Table 12 , show that our baseline CAR results are consistent with those reported before, and thus it is unlikely that the measurement window is driving our results.
Finally, we also address any concern regarding the fact that our results may be biased if our 3-and 5-year investment banker experience measures are incomplete for the earlier set of investment bankers (in 2001 and 2002) . Thus, we redo our analysis using data for 3-year experience measures but starting with deals announced after 2003 to allow for Mergermarket to compile experience information regarding all investment bankers in our sample. Similarly, we conduct our analyses with the 5-year measure for deals announced after 2005. Columns 4 and 5 of Panel B in Table 12 report the results of these tests and show that our main results do not change if we use the restricted samples. Thus, our results are not driven by the timing of coverage of investment bankers in Mergermarket.
G. Density of Investment Bankers
We also consider the possibility that investment banks with many bankers working in a particular industry may not be significantly affected by employing another investment banker in that industry. Thus, it is possible that our results may be driven by banks that have a small extent of coverage in an industry. Although we do not have data on the number of investment bankers specializing in an industry at the investment bank level, we can proxy for this using the extent of advisory business done by the investment bank in the banker's industry. In unreported tests, we control our CAR regressions for ACQUIRER ADVISOR INDUSTRY SHARE, which is the log of 1 plus the ratio of the dollar value of advisory business done by the investment bank in the investment banker's industries over the prior 3 years and the dollar value of all acquisitions in the investment banker's industries in the prior 3 years. In unreported tests, we find that our CAR results do not change as a result of adding this control variable to our regressions. Further, we interact PRIOR DEAL EXP with ACQUIRER ADVISOR INDUSTRY SHARE. The interaction term is not statistically significant, whereas PRIOR DEAL EXP continues to be statistically and economically significant. Thus, it is unlikely that our results are driven by lower advisory coverage in the investment bankers' industries.
H. Can Investment Bankers Select Better Deals?
An alternative explanation that bankers may simply be good at joining higher-quality acquisitions that have already been awarded to the bank is not consistent with our results. Our IV analyses rule out noncausal stories based on unobservable effects, such as investment bankers "latching on" to good deals.
VI. Conclusion
Using a novel data set that links individual investment bankers and investment banks to acquisition deals that they advise on, we address the following question: Does value creation by investment banks in acquisitions arise primarily from the reputation and other institutional strengths of a given investment bank, or does it also arise from the human capital of the individual investment bankers employed by that bank? We find that individual investment bankers indeed have a significant impact on the performance of the deals that they advise, over and above the effect of the investment bank. First, we find that investment bankers' prior deal experience is significantly and positively related to acquisition CAR and post-acquisition operating performance. We find that these effects are stronger for acquirers in more complex and opaque industries. Second, using graduation-year stock market performance and point in career as of the acquisition date as the instrument for bankers' experience, we show that the positive relation between investment banker experience and acquisition performance is causal. Third, we find that acquisition deals with more experienced investment banking teams fetch higher fees for the investment banks that they work for. Finally, we find that when more experienced investment bankers switch to a new bank, acquirers are more likely to move with them. Overall, our results suggest that an important source of the value to acquirers of using investment bank advisors is the skill and ability of the individual investment bankers working on the deal.
Appendix. Description of Dependent and Control Variables
Dependent Variables CAR(−2, +2): Cumulative returns of the acquirer over a 7-day period around the acquisition announcement (i.e., from 2 days prior to 2 days after the announcement of the deal) minus the predicted returns from a market model over the same period. CAR(−3, +3): Cumulative returns of the acquirer over a 7-day period around the acquisition announcement (i.e., from 3 days prior to 3 days after the announcement of the deal) minus the predicted returns from a market model over the same period. CAR(−5, +5): Cumulative returns of the acquirer over a 4-day period around the acquisition announcement (i.e., from 5 days prior to 5 days after the announcement of the deal) minus the predicted returns from a market model over the same period. ABNORMAL ROA: Residual from the regression of the average 3-year post-acquisition industry-adjusted ratio of operating income to assets (ROA) on the average 3-year pre-acquisition industry-adjusted ROA.
Deal Characteristics LOG TRANSACTION VALUE: Log of the transaction value of the deal. TENDER OFFER DEAL: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is a tender offer, and 0 otherwise. FRIENDLY DEAL: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is friendly, and 0 otherwise. DIVERSIFYING DEAL: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the primary Fama-French (1997) industry of the acquirer is different from that of the target, and 0 otherwise. PERC CASH: Percentage of the acquisition financed with cash. PUBLIC TARGET: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is public, and 0 otherwise.
Acquirer Characteristics LOG ACQUIRER ASSETS: Log of book value of total assets. ACQUIRER ROA: Operating income of the acquirer divided by book value of total assets. ACQUIRER MARKET TO BOOK: Market value of acquirer's total assets divided by book value of total assets. 
